There is always someone who can benefit from information you are willing to share. Sharing information that will help others almost sounds like the second Golden Rule, or at least a simple moral we would teach our children.

But can this same simple rule apply to a “real world” maritime scenario? For instance, as a backdrop for the information to be shared, let’s add drug trafficking, crime syndicates, terrorist plots, national security implications, advanced military technology and weaponry, seas that cover 70 percent of the world’s surface, 90 percent of the world’s cargo, marauding pirates, governmental sovereignty, agency jurisdictions, multi-million dollar corporate losses, and legal liabilities. Is it then so easy to apply our second Golden Rule? It certainly is necessary but it can get a bit more complicated.

This backdrop is unfortunately the current status of the maritime environment, and while sharing information plays a role in the overall national maritime security structure, it often gets lost in the race for higher fences, more grant allocations and the latest and supposedly greatest technologies.

Information Sharing: Harder than it looks

An essential component to security within any transportation or critical infrastructure sector is intelligence. Accurate and timely information can prevent, deter and discover all forms of criminal and terrorist activity and is the true foundation of any proactive security philosophy.

It is understandable then that in 1998, a Presidential Directive (PDD 63) was published calling for a “national effort to assure the security of the United States’ increasingly vulnerable and interconnected infrastructures” and stating that “Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) are encouraged to be set up by the private sector in cooperation with Federal government.”

Over the years, this idea of information sharing with the private sector has been reinforced by numerous government documents and testimonies. As an example, in 2006, An Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan, written by the Information Sharing Environment Office and the Information Sharing Council, noted “private sector information represents a crucial element in both understanding the current threat environment and protecting our nation’s critical infrastructure from targeted attacks.”

Several industries, prompted by these overt calls for collaboration by government, began establishing various critical infrastructure ISACs. Indeed, in 2003 the National Council of ISACs was founded, providing 16 active ISAC organizations with a forum for collaboration between both the critical infrastructures themselves and their respective government partners.

While the concept of ISACs is accepted as sound and both government and industry are cognizant of the potential benefits, obstacles remain. Three issues stand out:

Information overload: Noted American physicist William Pollard said, “Information is a source of learning. But unless it is organized, processed and available to the right people for decision making, it is a burden, not a benefit.” We are truly suffering from information fatigue. There is so much information, coming from so many sources, that it often becomes a detriment rather than a benefit to those trying to use it.

Ambiguous lines of communication: While sharing the information is half the battle, recognizing who can best use the information is the other half. Where can I get the information I need? How will the information I share be used? These questions rarely have a definitive answer, particularly when faced with ever evolving rotations within government agencies. A familiar, and frustrating, scenario is industry representatives working for months and years establishing relationships with agency contacts only to have those contacts rotate out to another agency or office with their replacement having no background on the prior relationship established. This “treadmill collaboration”, where relationships can’t get to that next level of trust, can only negatively impact proper cooperation in the event of a terrorist act or crime.

Commitment Issues: Sharing is a matter of trust. It is understood that government and industry cooperation is essential to properly securing critical infrastructures. What is difficult to achieve is how both parties get over their apprehension of trust. Government, rightfully so, needs consistent reassurance that the information they share will only go to those who have been properly vetted. And industry, rightfully so, must be assured that the information they provide will not be used against them.

Essentially, these issues are exactly why ISACs were proposed: Industry will create a valid and important layer within the national security structure that can distill redundant and superfluous information flowing between government and industry through expert analysis; provide a centralized repository of information that can maintain sustained lines of communication; and work as a trusted agent between government and industry, assuring both confidentiality and anonymity.

ISAC for the Maritime Environment

It should be surprising therefore that despite the general understanding and acceptance throughout the maritime community that prevention is more operationally effective than response and recovery, the maritime industry does not yet have a reliable, comprehensive information sharing network. There is hesitation on both sides – some warranted, but most seems just territorial.

Admittedly, maritime transportation is a unique industry. It is international in scope, its boundaries are malleable and its impact on the global economy is unparalleled. There is more information to digest and more risk of information getting into the wrong hands. All the more reason to establish stronger bonds of cooperation and collaboration between industry and government…there is so much more to lose.

While the Maritime Security Council does indeed serve as a de facto Maritime ISAC, gathering information from open sources, analyzing specific maritime security issues, distributing the information to its membership, and representing the maritime industry as a member of the National Council of ISACs, much more needs to be done. The maritime industry needs an ISAC with complete government support. This “full service” Maritime ISAC will handle sensitive security information; provide real-time analytical support during incidents; offer trusted lines of communication; maintain a database of worldwide port conditions; and analyze – in a secure environment – information gathered from all interested parties.

Publilius Syrus, a writer from the 1st century BC wrote, “Anyone can hold the helm when the sea is calm” and I would suggest that an addendum to the quote could read “but it is when the sea is restless that those most prepared will find safety.” It is time for a “full service” Maritime ISAC.

U.S. trade security regulations and programs have translated into a focus on increased screening of carriers and cargo entering into the U.S. by customs and law enforcement agencies, but with a lesser emphasis on cargo carriers and containers departing the U.S. for foreign ports of call. This inequity in the level of protection afforded to the security of cargo carriers and containers on their outbound leg represents a threat to the integrity of the overall system.

While the U.S. is rightly concerned about the ports and supply chain elements within its national territory, it cannot afford to ignore the same concerns that are mirrored by its partners in global trade. International trade is driven by variables such as cargo volume, velocity and costs. The goal is for cargo to move successfully through its supply chain corridor at an increased velocity, at a low cost and with the highest degree of confidence in the security of the cargo being delivered. A loss of confidence in the integrity of the supply chain at any point in the system may result in delays, increased inspections by security authorities, and potential increased costs to the carriers.

For example, reduced emphasis on execution of security protocols for empty containers being shipped from the U.S. to foreign ports can represent a weakening of the U.S. link in the global supply chain. As long as no credible threats or incidents can be traced back to an empty container originating in the U.S., confidence in the U.S. link of the supply chain should remain intact. However, just one or two incidents of security threats or contraband discovered in “empty” containers arriving from a U.S. port will likely raise serious questions regarding the integrity in that U.S. supply chain link. This will undoubtedly have a negative cascade effect on the operations and finances of all of the participants in that segment of the trade mobility corridor.

The recent downgrading of America’s bond rating is the direct result of a general loss of global confidence in America’s political will or ability to follow through on its obligations. Since the safety, security, and efficiency of America’s trade mechanisms are key to its competitiveness within the global supply chain, perceived reluctance on the part of the U.S. government to uniformly apply protective security measures to outbound and inbound cargo containers could lead to increased scrutiny and disapproval of that component of America’s status in the global business and financial communities.

By Ron Thomason, VP, Strategic Programs for the MSC

The focus of any program for the acquisition and integration of systems and equipment into a company or vessel security program should be to achieve the optimal “man-machine mix” in order to:

1. Enhance the effectiveness of the security program;
2. Increase the efficiency of security personnel across the entire spectrum of enterprise operations;
3. Reduce the enterprise’s exposure to risk of legal, financial, or possible criminal liability in the event of a security incident; and
4. Reduce and amortize the cost of recurring security operations across the life of the systems procured.

Please note that the long-term cost savings objective is the last one I have identified. Well meaning company executive are often view security systems and equipment as a means of reducing recurring operating costs for security, which are often viewed as “expenses’ rather than an investment. They are willing to commit to sizable capital expenditures to procure, install, and integrate security systems, with the expectation of achieving an immediate return on their investment through the reduction of recurring costs for security personnel.

However, in order for security systems to function effectively the security staff must, at the very least, be as smart as the machines they operate. Selection of security systems as a means of reducing the cost of security operations through the elimination of well-trained and proficient security practitioners is short-sighted.

The ROI calculations should give due consideration to the very necessary cost for providing appropriate initial and recurring training for the people responsible for the effective use and field maintenance of the selected systems. Failing to do so may actually increase the company’s exposure to risks of financial, legal, and criminal liability in the event of a security incident that is traced back to the inability of security staff to effectively operate or maintain the security system, or adjust to effectively address an evolving security situation.

In short, the optimal “man-machine mix” MUST include an appropriate balance of trained and proficient personnel to effectively operate and maintain the security systems.

- By Ronald Thomason, Vice President, Strategic Programs, MSC

Pirates recognize that oil carriers are valuable targets of hijacking seizure for ransom, a business model that has proven increasingly lucrative. Pirates have already determined that the insurance carriers for crude oil carrier owners/operators are likely to negotiate and ultimately pay ransom to ensure the safety and recovery of the vessel crew, and protect against the loss of a valuable asset. The objective of pirates, therefore, is to leverage the willingness of the energy and risk management communities – along with the lack of international regulatory standards and ‘best practice’ guidelines for the prevention or and response to piratical incidents – into a recurring revenue stream.

It should be noted that energy and cargo vessels that diligently adhere to recommended practices for transiting maritime choke points or waters known for incidents of piracy, such as convoying through the contested area under the watchful eyes of a joint naval task force, are less likely to be attacked by pirates since there is a higher risk of interception and mission failure. Pirates are looking for the greatest return on their investment, and are willing to redirect their efforts on targets of opportunity that offer the highest probability of success. Pirates also have the additional revenue-generating option of selling the crude oil contained in hijacked vessels to unscrupulous brokers looking to make a quick profit on the spot market for crude, although we have no documented evidence of this occurring as yet.

Terrorists, however, are motivated by their political objectives. They are not influenced by money, and have proven their willingness to learn from previous mission failures and the patience to wait until they have expanded their capabilities to ensure a higher probability of mission success.

It should be remembered that al-Q’aida’s conducted an unsuccessful attack against the World Trade Center in 1993. Following that action, al-Q’aida conducted a study to determine why it failed, performed additional observation and analysis of their target, and modified their weapons and tactics to ensure a higher probability of success resulting in the 9/11 attacks. Given the expected psychological and financial impact of successful attacks against energy industry targets, such as oil tankers, offshore platforms, and pipelines, it is reasonable to assume that terrorists are willing to expend the time, energy and resources to achieve their strategic objective – especially since they have demonstrated their willingness to perish to achieve mission success.

Terrorists also have the advantage of being able to observe and adopt the successful tactics used by pirates to approach and seize control of an energy or chemical tanker. They have access to educated and talented people who share their beliefs, and who are willing to provide their knowledge of maritime vessel operations and expertise to help overcome some of the technical difficulties imposed by threat prevention and risk reduction measures implemented since the VBIED bombings of the USS Cole and the double-hulled LVCC Limburg.

It should not be assumed that a failure to sink a maritime energy carrier constitutes failure, since the terrorists’ objective is to impact the economies of U.S. and European governments they have targeted. An increase in the number of attacks directed against energy carriers, or attacks against these vessels while they are at anchor taking on crude via pipeline at an outer continental shelf (OCS) anchorage is likely to increase the level of uncertainty and risk for the companies conducting those operations, prompting an increase in their risk insurance premium and resulting in the increase of the cost of crude in the global marketplace, and of refined energy products at the pump. Add to that the long-term economic impact resulting from the extended deployment of multi-national maritime military assets, patrolling the contested waters to provide risk reduction and incident response for energy platforms and vessels in transit, and the terrorist will have – on some level – achieved their objective.

One aspect of the terrorist threat against the maritime community that has rarely surfaced for discussion is the potential for infiltration of “actors”, sympathetic to a terrorist cause, into the manpower pool for employment onboard commercial maritime energy, chemical, and cargo carriers. Hiring of vessel crewmen are often conducted by third-party agencies, who bear responsibility for conducting background check on potential hires to ensure they do not represent a criminal or terrorist theat. However, depending on the laws and resources of the countries in which these hiring agencies are based, many do not have access to the necessary level of background information needed for a proper assessment of the application. In fact, some countries prohibit the collection and use of the types of biometric information used to confirm the identity of workers for access onto vessels and into restricted or secure areas of maritime facilities or vessels.

As an example, a significant number of below-deck engineering seamen are Indonesian, the world’s largest Islamic country by population, and where many fundamentalist groups continue to operate. Organizations whose motives and objectives are guided by fundamentalist religious or political philosophies, such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and groups of veterans from Afghanistan and Mindanao training camps operating independently from JI, have access to manpower pools from which to recruit candidates for attacks against Western maritime interest and operations through sabotage.

Our perception of viable attack vectors against energy industry targets in the global maritime community must not be limited to our capabilities and expectations. In order to establish a degree of confidence in the integrity of the protective measures for our energy supply chain, we must be creative in our outlook of the potential threats, and be willing to invest in long-term solutions that give due consideration to our adversary’s patience, creativity, and commitment to achieving their objective. We must be willing to match their resourcefulness, diligence, and dedication measure for measure.

– By Ron Thomason
Vice President, Strategic Programs, Maritime Security Council

At issue are Transportation Worker Identification Credentials, or TWIC cards, now needed by truckers, stevedores, longshoreman and others for unescorted access to the nation’s ports.

The Department of Homeland Security has long touted the cards as one of the most important layers in its multilayered system to protect ports from terrorists.

But, in a highly critical report, the Government Accountability Office said Tuesday the program does not provide reasonable assurance that only qualified people get the credentials. In tests, GAO investigators got into ports using counterfeit TWICs or authentic TWICs acquired through fraudulent means, and by stating false reasons for needing access.

“This investigation raises a disturbing question: Are America’s ports actually safer now than they were a decade ago?” said Sen. Frank Lautenberg, D-New Jersey. “Not only were they able to access the port facilities, but they were able to drive a vehicle with a simulated explosive into a secure area,” he said.

An unclassified version of the report did not state how many tests were conducted, nor how many efforts were successful. But it said the tests were conducted at some of the nation’s busiest seaports.

The findings are significant because a TWIC card suggests that its holder is not a security threat and potentially eases access to thousands of facilities, including airports and military installations, the GAO said.

Transportation Security Administrator John Pistole defended the TWIC system, saying 35,000 of the 1.8 million applicants failed criminal background checks.

Under the program, those who fail background checks can request a waiver and be granted a TWIC. Ultimately, 1,158 applicants were denied cards because of their criminal histories or immigration status, the TSA said. In addition, several were disqualified because they were on terror watch lists.

But the GAO said there are ways for unqualified individuals to acquire authentic TWICs, and said the TSA had not established internal controls to protect against abuse. Further, the TWIC program does not require that applicants claiming to be U.S.-born citizens or nationals to provide identity documents that prove citizenship, the GAO said.

And controls are not in place to determine whether an applicant needs a TWIC, the GAO said.

“It seems to me that a decade of work has resulted in a system that would put Rube Goldberg to shame,” said Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Mississippi.

Said Lautenberg: “Given the critical importance of our ports, it is unacceptable that we are spending hundreds of millions of tax dollars on a program that might actually be making ports less safe.”

Rep. John Mica, R-Florida, said he is upset DHS has not approved a technology to read the credentials, meaning guards must visually examine the credentials. “TWIC is turning into a dangerous and expensive experiment in security,” he said in a statement.

“Nearly half a billion dollars has been spent since TSA was directed to issue biometric security cards to transportation workers,” Mica said. “Yet today, 10 years later and with no approved biometric reader, TWICs are at best no more useful than library cards.”

Sen. John Rockefeller, D-West Virginia, said he plans to address legislation in the coming months for some of the shortcomings exposed by the GAO. “The program needs stronger fraud controls,” he said. “We also need to take a clear, hard look at whether we are getting enough return on our investment. Is the money we’re spending on TWIC being used wisely? Are there other security programs that would cost less but work as well as TWIC? These are questions we need answers to.”

MSC’s Analysis: It is astounding that after 10 years DHS has yet to approve a technology that actually reads the credentials embedded into the TWIC card. Is TWIC an effective tool in preventing or deterring criminal and terrorist activities at a port? How are we to know? Without the proper scanning equipment to actually use the TWIC card the way it is intended, the U.S. government has simply spent hundreds of millions of dollars on, as Rep. John Mica so aptly put, a glorified “library card” that are being inspected by undertrained security guards. The GAO Report (to view the report click here) made two glaring observations: 1) DHS has never assessed TWIC’s effectiveness at reducing risks to facilities and vessels nor did the agency conduct a cost-benefit analysis; and 2) DHS has yet to complete a regulatory analysis for the upcoming rule on using TWIC with card readers. While the cost-benefit ship may have sailed a long time ago, DHS should approve the TWIC scanners, fast track implementation of scanners at all TWIC locations and then assess its effectiveness as a qualified layer of security.

They heard the surf a-roaring before the break of day;
But ’twas only with the peep of light we saw how ill we lay.
We tumbled every hand on deck instanter, with a shout,
And we gave her the maintops’l, and stood by to go about.

All day we tacked and tacked between the South Head and the North;
All day we hauled the frozen sheets, and got no further forth;
All day as cold as charity, in bitter pain and dread,
For very life and nature we tacked from head to head.

We gave the South a wider berth, for there the tide-race roared;
But every tack we made we brought the North Head close aboard:
So’s we saw the cliffs and houses, and the breakers running high,
And the coastguard in his garden, with his glass against his eye.

The frost was on the village roofs as white as ocean foam;
The good red fires were burning bright in every ‘long-shore home;
The windows sparkled clear, and the chimneys volleyed out;
And I vow we sniffed the victuals as the vessel went about.

The bells upon the church were rung with a mighty jovial cheer;
For it’s just that I should tell you how (of all days in the year)
This day of our adversity was blessed Christmas morn,
And the house above the coastguard’s was the house where I was born.

O well I saw the pleasant room, the pleasant faces there,
My mother’s silver spectacles, my father’s silver hair;
And well I saw the firelight, like a flight of homely elves,
Go dancing round the china-plates that stand upon the shelves.

And well I knew the talk they had, the talk that was of me,
Of the shadow on the household and the son that went to sea;
And O the wicked fool I seemed, in every kind of way,
To be here and hauling frozen ropes on blessed Christmas Day.

They lit the high sea-light, and the dark began to fall.
“All hands to loose topgallant sails,” I heard the captain call.
“By the Lord, she’ll never stand it,” our first mate Jackson, cried.
…”It’s the one way or the other, Mr. Jackson,” he replied.

She staggered to her bearings, but the sails were new and good,
And the ship smelt up to windward just as though she understood.
As the winter’s day was ending, in the entry of the night,
We cleared the weary headland, and passed below the light.

And they heaved a mighty breath, every soul on board but me,
As they saw her nose again pointing handsome out to sea;
But all that I could think of, in the darkness and the cold,
Was just that I was leaving home and my folks were growing old.

By Robert Louis Stevenson (1850-94)

Happy Holidays from the Maritime Security Council

Since ISPS Code implementation, oversight and enforcement of the comprehensive set of measures to enhance the security of commercial maritime facilities, vessels, and operations has been delegated to the Contracting Governments. While this policy approach encouraged agreement of the signatory countries to the measure, practical application has resulted in the uneven interpretation of the criteria for compliance.

Although it has taken almost eight years from since the agreement to the ISPS Code in December of 2002, it is expected that the IMO’s development of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) manual for port and ship security will help harmonize performance-based criteria for “functional” compliance with ISPS Code requirements and recommendations throughout the global maritime community.

The IMO’s development of this Port and Ship Security Manual provides the commercial maritime industry with an opportunity to provide insights into the challenges that are unique to the operations of its varied sectors. Passenger cruise vessels have security issues that are different from those experienced by cargo and energy carriers, or outer-continental shelf platforms.

A “one size fits all” approach to security practices to achieve ISPS Code compliance is likely to result in weaknesses in the maritime components of the global trade and transportation systems. For example, passenger cruise vessel Ship Security Officers (SSO) have to deal with crimes against persons (passengers and crew), as well as property crimes committed onboard the vessels while it is in international waters.

Although there has been a noticeable increase in reporting of these types of threats on board vessels with increasingly larger numbers of passenger, training and certification of the SSOs remains focused on the prevention of and response to crimes such as piracy and terrorism. The lack of guidance from the IMO as to standards for SSO execution of the basic law enforcement procedures necessary to ensure the deliberate execution of investigatory and prosecutorial actions by an appropriate law enforcement authority presents an increased risk of legal and financial vulnerability to the passenger carrier community and, to a lesser degree, the cargo carrier as well.

Hopefully the IMO’s Port and Ship Security Manual will provide meaningful guidelines for successfully addressing the credible security threats and challenges associated with the maritime facilities, vessels, and operations that are subject to the ISPS Code.

-By Ron Thomason

A Citadel is a designated pre-planned area specifically built into the ship where – in the event of imminent boarding by pirates – all crew can seek refuge with the objective of preventing the pirates from gaining control of the vessel. The Citadel should have control capability of the vessel, emergency rations, safe air supply, CCTV control and good external communications.

Is a Citadel a safe solution? Well, several incidents have proven that it can thwart pirates’ efforts to take over a ship. In several cases now, the crew made it safely to the Citadel, sat tight, and the pirates were apprehended by naval forces or just gave up.

Citadels can also improve the effectiveness of naval forces. If the crew is safely ensconced in the Citadel, it can then allow naval forces, who in the past have been hesitant to intervene on a vessel once the pirates are on board for fear of harming the crew, to engage the pirates knowing the crew is safe.

There are risks. Pirates have proven they adapt and it won’t be long before we’ll be hearing of incidents where more effective explosives than rebounding RPGs are being used to gain access to these safe rooms. One can only imagine how the pirates will respond to the crew after gaining access, not to mention potential casualties from the explosives. But many Citadels are being built in areas within the vessel that can withstand explosives (double bulkhead protection) and are being equipped with safeguards to protect the crews from attempted forced entry.

There is also a risk of vandalism as pirates become frustrated if they cannot gain access but repairing vandalism damage is certainly preferable to a crew of hostages and ransom fees.

So is this the solution…no. Until we see “stability” and “Somalia” in the same headline, pirates will continue to threaten vessels in the region. Vessels should continue to follow the guidelines established in the BMP3 and keep up-to-date with latest reports on pirate activity.

Citadels won’t stop the pirates from attempting to board. But what they can do, when the situation warrants, is help address many of the issues impacting the industry once pirates have boarded: giving the crew a chance to remain safe; preventing the pirates from gaining control of the vessel; and offering naval forces time to reach the vessel and engage the hijackers. Not to mention it’s more cost-effective than armed security or escorts.

- By Greg Girard

This event will gather together an elite group of government and yachting industry professionals to discuss the pertinent security issues facing the international yachting and small maritime vessel community and their host nation governments.

The agenda for this meeting will focus on identifying security “best practices” appropriate for application to the yachting industry, and serve to prevent the yachting industry from becoming an avenue for the introduction of threats into yachting marinas throughout the hemisphere.

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As a bit of background on the event, the M. STAR was eastbound approaching the Straits late in the evening when it was approached by two small boats that apparently originated in Oman. Based on information from the ship’s radar that was stored on the Voyage Data Recorder (VDR), the boats approached from astern, moved alongside to the bow and then fell back. One of the two boats apparently exploded and the second sped away on a heading toward Oman.

The ship sustained hull damage – a large dent in the starboard quarter – and some interior damage and the loss of a lifeboat as well. Luckily, there was only one minor injury and there was no pollution. The ship steamed to Fujairah where repairs were undertaken and an investigation ensued.

Initial causes for the casualty ranged from a rogue wave to an errant and abandoned mine to a collision with another vessel to the eventual cause – terrorism. Assets from the US Navy inspected the ship’s damage, as did the Coast Guard of the United Arab Republics (UAE), the Republic of the Marshall Islands (the vessel’s flag state) and investigators appointed by the ship’s owner – Mitsui O.S.K. Lines.

Eventually, it was determined that the damage was the result of an IED, probably trinitrotoluene (TNT or dynamite). As to those who delivered the explosive, it has been generally accepted that the attack was NOT state sponsored and, in fact, was carried out by an Al Qaeda faction that has been trying to gain acceptance and credibility in the terrorist world. But dubbed as the “gang that couldn’t shoot straight,” this seems to be another in a series of miscues.

The Brigades of Abdullah Azzam did claim that a suicide bomber blew himself up on the ship and the monitoring group SITE Intelligence reported on its website that the militant group claimed it had placed a suicide bomber on the tanker, identifying him as Ayyub Al Taishan. It said the attack was carried out in the name of Omar Abdul Rahman, the Egyptian “Blind Sheikh” imprisoned in the United States for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York. Analysis can neither confirm nor refute that anyone actually blew up with the explosives laden skiff. There is some belief that the two small craft came alongside the M. STAR and the helm of the bomb boat was tied down while the terrorist jumped to the other boat which sped away before the blast. This belief is bolstered by the fact that the bomb exploded far enough from the ship that the damage wasn’t devastating.

Analysts continue to evaluate the evidence and the implications. Several nations – the United States, the Marshall Islands and Japan – have warned their vessels to maintain heightened vigilance while transiting the straits and INTERTANKO has alerted the tanker community in general to the threat. The US Navy has kept mum on its tactical response but it is known that NavCent (US Naval Forces Central Command) is considering numerous options to counter the threat. The National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) is also all over this and has been since the initial reports of the incident.

While this attack was not state sponsored, it does point to the vulnerability of this critical choke point in global maritime commerce. With Iran now boasting a new UAV drone of its own, the potential for state and/or terrorist sponsored attacks on vessels transiting the Straits of Hormuz cannot be overstated. That is the challenge facing the world’s navies and the commercial shipping industry and it’s a challenge that will apparently be with us for years to come.

– By Henry Morgan
The views expressed in the following commentary do not necessary reflect the views/opinions of the Maritime Security Council. The following is provided to offer varying perspectives on maritime security issues throughout the world.